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INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the 1970s, many different governments around the world have 
sought to transfer power to sub-state governments, meaning that devolution has 
become a key ‘global trend’ of recent decades (Rodriguez-Pose and Gill, 2003). 
The term devolution can be defined as a form of political decentralisation, 
involving a “transfer of power downwards to political authorities at immediate or 
local levels” (Agranoff, 2004, p.26). Devolution has introduced in response to 
pressures exerted on established states from both ‘below’ and ‘above’, referring to 
demands from regions within the state for more say over their own affairs and the 
effects of processes of globalisation and supra-national integration respectively 
(Keating, 1997; Tomaney, 2000). Arguments for devolution have variously 
stressed questions of identity in relation to the recognition of minority groups, 
governance in terms of creating more effective political institutions, and the 
economy by allowing regions to adapt to changes in the economic environment 
and to fulfil their economic potential (Rodriguez-Pose and Sandall, 2008). 
Devolution can be seen as part of the broader territorial and functional 
restructuring of established nation-states since the late 1970s, involving, inter alia, 
a shift away from Keynesian economic policies, efforts to reduce welfare 
expenditure, the adoption of neoliberal notions of limited government, and the 
rise of supra-national institutions like the European Union (EU) (Goodwin et al., 
2005; Jessop, 2002; Peck, 2001). This has led to a proliferation of scales and sites 
of governance, meaning that nation-states are no longer the undisputed locus of 
political power and authority (Jessop, 1999). The concept of multi-level 
governance been developed by political scientists to refer to the co-existence of 
different political levels, including the local, regional and supra-national alongside 
the national. In a European context particularly, the concept has provided a 
framework for several influential studies of functional policy networks which 
operate vertically, linking actors together across the different levels in a common 
framework of expectations (Dowding, 1995; Marks, 1996; Pierre and Stoker, 
2000). Similarly, political geographers are concerned with the ‘rescaling’ of the 
state and ‘the politics of scale’ in terms of the production of different scales of 
governance such as the national, regional and European and the efforts of political 
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actors to operate across these (Cox, 1998; Goodwin et al., 2005; Smith, 1996; 
Swyngedouw, 2000).  
In practice, the ‘global trend’ of devolution has produced an assortment of 
institutional arrangements, according to the nature of the decentralisation process 
in question and its interaction with pre-existing state structures, administrative 
practices and political relations (Jeffery, 2002; Rodriguez-Pose and Gill, 2003). The 
United Kingdom (UK) represents a particularly interesting case of political 
decentralisation in view of the long-standing centralisation of political and 
economic power in London, the relatively late introduction of constitutional 
change in 1999-2000 and the particular form that devolution has taken (Keating, 
2001). Indeed, for some commentators, devolution represents perhaps the most 
important change to the fabric of the British state for three hundred years 
(Gamble, 2006), although others are more sceptical, viewing the changes as 
largely cosmetic and illusory, disguising the continuing reality of centralised 
government (Nairn, 1997). The approach adopted by the UK government in the 
late 1990s was one of ‘devolution on demand’ with the constituent territories of 
the UK gaining different types of devolved institutions, according to perceived 
levels of support for change. Accordingly, an elected parliament was established in 
Scotland, elected assemblies in Wales and Northern Ireland, and an elected mayor 
and assembly in London which had been stripped of city-wide government by the 
abolition of the Greater London Council (GLC) in the 1980s (Figure 1). In the rest 
of England, where demand for change was generally lower, there was only limited 
administrative reform through the creation of Regional Development Agencies 
(RDAs) and unelected Regional Assemblies (these are now being abolished). This 
amounts to a system of asymmetrical devolution in which different territories have 
been granted different powers and institutional arrangements (see Hazell, 2000; 
Jeffery, 2007; Keating, 2001). 
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Caption: Devolution in the UK  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One of key claims made by proponents of devolution is that it will 
strengthen the economies of devolved regions by providing more locally-tailored 
and efficient forms of political support and by enhancing processes of regional 
innovation and learning (Morgan, 2006; Rodriguez-Pose and Sandall, 2008). This 
claim is widely supported by ‘new regionalist’ thinking amongst policy-makers and 
researchers, based on the notion that regions have become more prominent as 
units of economic organisation and political action under late capitalism (Amin, 
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1999; Lovering, 1999; MacKinnon et al., 2002). Recently, however, the purported 
economic benefits of devolution have been subject to greater critical scrutiny with 
one comparative study suggesting that devolution actually tends to enhance 
regional disparities  (Rodriguez-Pose and Gill, 2004), while another author failed to 
find any evidence of an ‘economic dividend’ of devolution in the UK (Morgan, 
2006).  
In the remainder of this paper, I examine the relationship between 
devolution and regional economic development in the UK. The next section 
highlights the key institutional features of UK devolution and outlines the political 
debates surrounding it. I then turn to consider regional disparities and regional 
policy in the UK in the context of devolution, echoing the conclusion that there is 
no clear evidence of an ‘economic dividend’. This is a followed by an examination 
of a particular policy measure adopted by some of the UK devolved 
administrations, air Route Development Funds, which was justified on regional 
development grounds and illustrates some of the dynamics of multilevel 
governance. A brief concluding section summarises the main points of the paper 
and assesses their implications.  
 
DEVOLUTION AND MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE IN THE UK 
 
The global trend of political decentralisation over the past three decades 
represents a partial reversal of the integrationist, state nationalist projects that 
were dominant throughout the 400 year or so period leading up the Second World 
War (Rodriguez-Pose and Sandall, 2008, p.54). From this perspective, the upsurge 
of regional ‘neo-nationalism’ that occurred in parts of Europe and North America 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s took many analysts by surprise, confounding the 
widespread assumption among social scientists that territorial allegiances had been 
eroded by modernisation in favour of functional and class-based cleavages 
(Keating, 1998; McCrone, 1998; Rokkan and Urwin, 1982). The associated 
regionalist discourses of decentralisation have gained widespread traction in a 
context of relative peace, at least in much of the developed world, thus removing 
some of the force of the integrationist, nation-building projects of previous 
decades and creating space for the expression of regional identities (Rodriguez-
Pose and Sandall, 2008, p.67). At the same time, globalisation and the new 
regionalism is associated with a reordering of economic and political spaces, 
encouraging the growth of multiple identities, including different territorial 
allegiances (ibid). The associated abandonment of the Keynesian goal of spatial 
equity in favour of the neoliberal concept of competitiveness has also fuelled 
decentralisation discourses in terms of the need for regions to gain the political 
powers necessary to compete successfully in an increasingly global economy (see 
Lovering, 1999).  
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Rather than operating as a unitary state which strives to create a single 
national culture through processes of administrative standardisation, the UK can 
be described as a ‘union state’ (Mitchell, 2004). Rokkan and Urwin’s (1982, p.11) 
influential definition describes this type of state as:  
 
not the result of straightforward dynastic conquest. Incorporation of at 
least parts of its territory has been achieved through personal dynastic 
union, for example by treaty, marriage or inheritance. Integration is less 
than perfect. While administrative standardisation prevails over much of 
the territory, the consequences of personal union entail the survival in 
some areas of pre-union rights and institutional infrastructures which 
preserve some degree of regional autonomy and act as agencies of 
indigenous elite recruitment.  
 
Scotland provides the clearest example of this, retaining control over its 
own established church and education and legal systems after the Act of Union 
with England Wales in 1707 (Paterson, 1994). In the 1960s, the territorial 
organisation of the state became a major political issue as support for regional 
nationalism rose dramatically in both Scotland and Wales with the Scottish 
National Party (SNP) emerging from obscurity to gain 30 per cent of the popular 
vote in Scotland in the October 1974 general election (Tomaney, 2000). In 
response, Tom Nairn (1977) famously asserted that the demands of peripheral 
neo-nationalism in Scotland and Wales would ultimately lead to ‘the break-up of 
Britain’, which he regarded as an archaic pre-modern state. While Welsh 
nationalism was primarily concerned with cultural issues concerned with the 
protection of the Welsh language, Scottish nationalism assumed a more economic 
character, arguing that Scotland could better meet its economic needs by breaking 
away from the rest of the UK, an argument that received a substantial boost from 
the discovery of oil in the North Sea off the Scottish coast in the late 1960s, 
prompting the popular SNP slogan, ‘It’s Scotland’s oil’ (Harvie and Jones, 2000)!  
Peripheral nationalism posed a considerable threat to the interest of the two 
major UK-wide political parties: the Conservatives and Labour. It was the then 
Conservative leader, Edward Heath’s, surprise conversion to the merits of political 
decentralisation in 1968, when he announced that the Conservatives would 
support a directly-elected Scottish assembly, that really initiated the ‘top-down’ 
debate about devolution among the UK political parties. Subsequently, the term 
devolution has tended to be emphasised by the top-down discourses of 
modernisation and reform associated with the state-wide political parties, officials 
and media while nationalist and regionalist movements and campaigners have 
favoured the more emotive and identity-laden notion of ‘home rule’, evoking a 
sense of regional autonomy and control. The ‘national question’ was particularly 
troubling for the Labour Party since its ability to form UK-wide governments at 
Westminster was crucially dependent on it retaining seats in industrial working-
class communities in Central Scotland and South Wales that were being targeted 
by nationalists (Marr, 1992). After a protracted debate, the Labour government of 
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1974-1979 announced its support for devotion, introducing legislation for the 
establishment of elected assemblies in Scotland and Wales in 1977. These 
proposals proved highly controversial, with prominent Labour politicians in 
Scotland and Wales opposing their own government’s policy and ultimately failed 
to gain sufficient support from the public in referendums held in March 1979 
(Harvie and Jones, 2000).2 
Under Margaret Thatcher, the neo-liberal Conservative governments of the 
1980s were strongly opposed to devolution for Scotland and Wales, arguing that 
this would simply add an extra layer of government and bureaucracy. By the late 
1980s, however, the political unpopularity of the Conservatives in Scotland and 
Wales was fostering renewed support for devolution. This provoked the 
emergence of a distinct ‘civil politics’ (Marr, 1992) through the formation of a 
territorial coalition as opposition parties (excluding the SNP), trade unions, local 
authorities, the Churches, women’s groups and others came together to form the 
Scottish Constitutional Convention in 1989 (MacLeod, 1998).3 The Labour Party 
reaffirmed its support for elected assemblies for Scotland and Wales in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, with the Party’s leader between 1992 and 1994, John 
Smith, describing devolution as “the settled will of the Scottish people” (Devine 
1999, p.615). Yet, ‘new’ Labour under Tony Blair remained cautious about 
devolution, lest it be accused of favouring ‘big government’ or running ahead of 
public opinion with support for devolution largely confined to the ‘Celtic fringe’ of 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland (Morgan and Mungham, 2001). For 
instance, its plans for regional government in England were clearly watered down 
in the run-up to the 1997 General Election, and Scottish devolution was subjected 
to a two-question referendum (Tomaney, 2000). It is the combination of 
geographically uneven levels of support for devolution and the Labour 
government’s cautious, piecemeal approach after 1997 that has resulted in highly 
asymmetrical arrangements (Morgan and Mungham, 2001). The Scottish 
Parliament was granted full legislative powers and the financial power to vary 
income tax by up to 3 pence in pound whilst the Welsh Assembly was established 
as a smaller and weaker body, lacking primary legislative power. The Northern 
Ireland Assembly also has primary legislative powers, potentially covering a wider 
range of policy areas than Scotland given the proposal to transfer certain 
‘reserved’ powers at some unspecified point in the future (Keating, 2002).   
One of the defining characteristics of UK devolution is the fact that the 
devolved administrations lack substantial revenue raising powers of their own in 
contrast to the systems of fiscal autonomy and transfer found in many other 
                                                 
2  A majority of those who voted in Scotland were in favour, but this was not deemed adequate due to a 
parliamentary amendment, introduced by a Labour backbencher, which required 40 per cent of the entire 
electorate to support the proposals. 51.6 per cent voted in favour on a 64 per cent turnout, amounting to 
32.9 per cent of the electorate. In Wales, only 20 per cent voted in favour with 80 per cent against. 
3  The role of the Convention was to formulate proposals for the establishment for an elected Parliament. 
These were eventually published in November 1995, feeding into the Labour Government’s White Paper in 
July 1997.  
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devolved and federal states (Jeffery, 2007; Mitchell, 2004; Schmuecker and 
Adams, 2005). The principal mechanism for financing the devolved administrations 
in the UK is an annual block grant from HM Treasury, giving the devolved 
administrations almost total freedom to allocate funds to the different policy areas 
as they see fit (Adams and Schmuecker, 2005). The level of these grants is 
currently a function of the so-called ‘Barnett Formula’, named after the former 
(Labour) Chief Secretary to the Treasury, Lord Barnett, who established it in 1978. 
The Barnett formula grants Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland a population-
based share of increases in public expenditure awarded to England (Bell and 
Christie, 2001). In theory, this formula should result in gradual convergence over 
time, but this has not happened with public spending per head remaining higher in 
the devolved territories of London, Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales (Figure 
2). In addition to the higher costs of delivering services in more rural jurisdictions 
and the concentration of national administrative and cultural functions in London, 
this would seem to reflect the additional political weight of Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland in the union prior to legislative devolution with territorial 
Secretaries of State who were able to argue for additional spending. Devolution 
has helped to politicise the geographically uneven distribution of public 
expenditure, which seems to bear little relation to need.  For example, per capita 
public expenditure was 9 per cent higher in Scotland than the neighbouring region 
of North East England in 2006-2007 but gross disposable income per head in the 
latter region was 9 per cent lower (HM Treasury, 2008; Office for National 
Statistics, 2008). Accordingly, the Labour government has faced pressure from 
representatives of Northern English regions for a reallocation of public expenditure 
according to needs (Morgan, 2001, 2006), something which it has resisted thus 
far, fearing the resultant political controversy.   
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Source: HM Treasury, 2008 
 
Despite its far-reaching implications for the constitutional fabric of the UK, 
devolution was introduced relatively smoothly, notwithstanding the best efforts of 
the Labour Party leadership in London to control leadership elections in Wales and 
London in 1999-2000 (Morgan and Mungham, 2001). This reflects three main 
factors. First, legislative devolution built on existing administrative arrangements in 
the form of territorial departments for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland which 
were already responsible for the delivery of large areas of public policy – including 
health, education, economic development and transport – and in so doing adapted 
UK-wide policies to suit local conditions (Mitchell, 2003). This legacy of pre-
existing institutions and practices made devolution easy to introduce (Jeffery, 
2005); in effect, democratic structures were grafted onto existing administrative 
arrangements, changing territorial administration into territorial politics (Jeffery, 
2007). Second, common Labour government in Westminster, Scotland and Wales 
(in coalition with the Liberal Democrats in Scotland 1999-2007 and in Wales 2000-
2003) acted as a force for stability in terms of the pressure to conform to the 
approach of the UK government and to avoid damaging ‘splits’ in policy (Laffin 
and Shaw, 2007). These political links have shaped the evolution of inter-
governmental relations under devolution, which operate in an informal and ad hoc 
fashion with an absence of explicit mechanisms to ensure coordination (Agranoff, 
2004; Trench, 2005).4 Third, devolution coincided with a period of substantial 
increases in public expenditure after 2000, reflecting the policy of the UK 
government at Westminster to invest heavily in health and education, resulting in 
large budget increases for the devolved administrations through the Barnett 
formula (Table 1). Interestingly, these have now changed, creating a new territorial 
politics of devolution characterised by increased tensions between devolved and 
central government. Devolved elections in 2007 saw the entry of nationalist parties 
into government in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, and London gained a 
conservative mayor in 2008, while deteriorating economic conditions have led to 
much tighter financial settlements for the devolved administrations.  
 
 
REGIONAL POLICY AND DEVOLUTION 
  
Concerns about a North-South divide in levels of wealth and prosperity in 
Britain have been periodically expressed since the 1930s (Massey, 2001). In the 
1980s, the combined impact of the neo-liberal reforms of the Thatcher 
government and wider processes of deindustrialisation seemed to have resulted in 
                                                 
4  Local authorities, of which there are 32 in Scotland, 22 in Wales, 26 in N. Ireland and 32 ‘boroughs’ in 
London, represent a third level of governance in the devolved territories. They are responsible for the 
delivery of local services such as schools, social work, roads, housing and refuse collection but remain 
dependent on devolved or central government for around 75-80 per cent of their funding 
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the emergence of ‘two nations’: a prosperous and dynamic South in which most of 
the growth industries were located and a stagnant and impoverished North, scarred 
by industrial dereliction, poverty and unemployment (Martin, 1988). The late 
1990s saw evidence emerge that the divide had widened under New Labour 
(Massey, 2001) after narrowing in the recession of the early 1990s (Figure 3), 
creating political problems for a government, which drew many of its Ministers and 
Members of Parliament (MPs) from the North. Broadly, three groups of regions can 
be identified: the prosperous regions of South East England; an intermediate group 
where prosperity is significantly lower; and the three lagging regions of Wales, 
Northern Ireland and North East England (Figure 4). While financial and business 
services, predominantly concentrated in South East England, experienced 
considerable growth between 1997 and 2005, over a million manufacturing jobs 
were lost over the same period, many of them in the North (Office for National 
Statistics, 2006). 
 
GVA per capita, 1989-2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adams, Robinson and Vigor, 2003, p.2.  
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Gross disposable income per head 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Office for National Statistics, 2008. 
 
Regional policy has acquired a new prominence in the UK since 1997, 
reflecting the fact that Labour continues to draw most of its MPs from the post-
industrial ‘periphery’ of Northern England, Scotland and South Wales. The ‘new’ 
regional policy adopted by Labour understood regional under-performance in 
terms of a failure to provide a suitable business environment for firms. The 
suggestion is that firms and workers in these regions are not sufficiently productive 
or efficient. Five regional ‘drivers’ of productivity were identified in government 
publications: skills, investment, innovation, enterprise and competition (HM 
Treasury, 2001). The way to improve regional economic performance is to address 
these drivers of productivity, often framed in terms of competitiveness, defined as 
the capacity of the regional economy to compete more effectively in an 
increasingly globalised world. In addition to the devolved administrations in 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, the main agents responsible for the 
implementation of this approach are the RDAs, which were established in the eight 
standard English regions outside London in 1999 (Jones, 2001). The RDAs were 
given five specific tasks: economic development and regeneration; business 
support, investment and competitiveness; skills and education; employment 
promotion; and sustainable development (Department of Environment, Transport 
and the Regions (DETR), 1997).  
As Stephen Fothergill (2005) observed, three key features distinguish this 
new style regional policy from earlier approaches. First, it is very much focused on 
 REDES, Santa Cruz do Sul, v. 14, n. 1, p. 82 - 105, jan./abr. 2009 
 
93 
 
indigenous development, in terms of improving conditions within regions, in 
contrast to the ‘old’ regional policy of the 1960s and 1970s, which employed 
financial incentives to induce companies to locate large-scale investments in 
lagging regions, reinforcing a broader shift that began in the 1980s. Second, it 
emphasises the need to improve the operation of markets, identifying ‘market 
failure’ as a key cause of under-performance, reflecting orthodox economic 
thinking. Third, the responsibility for devising and implementing policy has moved 
from the centre to the regions themselves, reflecting the logic of devolution and a 
wider emphasis on ‘local solutions to local problems’ (Amin et al., 2003). There are 
several problems with this new approach to regional policy, including its neglect of 
the relationships between regions; a narrow preoccupation with productivity and 
‘competitiveness’; its predisposition towards market-based solutions; and a failure 
to take account of the sectoral and structural composition of regional economies 
(Fothergill, 2005). Crucially, the ‘new’ regional policy treats ‘unequal regions 
equally’ by following the same competitiveness-based approach in all regions, 
irrespective of their level of prosperity, in contrast to the old regional policy which 
targeted resources on the least favoured regions (Morgan, 2002). Contrary to the 
proclamations of government minsters, this means that the ‘new’ approach cannot 
be expected to reduce regional disparities, with the most prosperous regions likely 
to benefit the most, operating more as a regionally-delivered national growth 
strategy.  
The first main task of the RDAs was to develop economic strategies for their 
regions. While this offered some scope for divergence, the realities of central 
government control ensured that the similarities between the regional strategies 
outweigh the differences, requiring consistency with the UK government’s 
knowledge-based economy strategy (Raco, 2002). At the same time, Scotland and 
Wales did not stand still, with Scotland continuing to lead the way in the 
development of innovative policies (Gillespie and Benneworth, 2002). Through its 
Smart, Successful Scotland approach, the Scottish Government (2001) developed a 
‘science and skills’ strategy that stressed the need to commercialise the scientific 
research base, strengthen global connectivity and encourage a culture of lifelong 
learning. With the formation of the new SNP Government in 2007, Smart, 
Successful Scotland gave way to the Scottish Government Economic Strategy which 
emphasises the lessons to be learned from adjacent small, independent states such 
as Norway, Denmark, Ireland and Iceland – the so-called ‘arc of prosperity’ 
(Scottish Government, 2007).  In addition to forming new departments and 
committees to oversee economic development, the Welsh Assembly Government 
incorporated the functions of the WDA, Education and Learning Wales (ELWa) and 
the Welsh Tourist Board (WTB) into the Assembly through the so-called ‘bonfire of 
the quangos’ in 2006 (Goodwin et al., 2005). Its approach to economic 
development has emphasised the need to close the GDP gap with the rest of the 
UK and to tackle the problems of disadvantaged areas, mainly though the EU-
funded Objective 1 programme for West Wales and the Valleys (Adams and 
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Robinson, 2005). In Northern Ireland, the major reform has been the establishment 
of a single economic development agency, Invest Northern Ireland (INI) (Goodwin 
et al., 2002).  
In structural terms, devolution has perhaps encouraged some convergence 
in the governance of economic development, through the formation of new 
departments and committees and the establishment of RDAs in the English regions 
(Gillespie and Benneworth, 2002). On a strategic level, development agencies are 
talking a similar language of knowledge, innovation and competitiveness across the 
UK (Adams and Robinson, 2005), but Scotland seems to have the most advanced 
policies for building a knowledge-based economy. Based on a study of economic 
development policy, Cooke and Clifton (2005) identify three varieties of devolution 
in the UK. The visionary approach embraced in Scotland through the development 
of innovative knowledge-based initiatives contrasts with the precautionary 
approach adopted in Wales, concentrating on target setting and institutional 
reform, and the constrained nature of devolution in Northern Ireland where the 
suspension of the Assembly and the perpetuation of direct rule between 2002 and 
2007 limited the scope for the introduction of new policy measures.   
Proponents of devolution have commonly argued that one of its main 
tangible benefits will be improved economic performance (Rodriguez-Pose and Gill, 
2004; Hudson, 2005) and many sceptics view the capacity of the devolved 
administrations to deliver in this area as a key test of devolution. This is particularly 
the case in Wales where the purported benefits of devolution were highly 
prominent in the campaign for the establishment of an Assembly (Morgan, 2001) 
and the English regions.5 In practice, however, the so-called ‘economic dividend’ 
has proved rather elusive, something which Morgan (2006, p.200) terms the ‘dirty 
little secret’ of devolution’. It is, of course, important to acknowledge the difficultly 
of isolating a devolution effect from the myriad other influences that shape 
economic performance and that it is still relatively early in the lives of the devolved 
institutions. Furthermore, the economic powers of the devolved administrations 
remain limited, with macroeconomic policy reserved to Westminster. Nevertheless, 
although the devolved administrations have been highly active in launching a range 
of economic strategies and initiatives, there is no evidence that these have been 
translated into improved economic performance compared to the non-devolved 
territories of the UK (ibid). Accordingly, devolution is unlikely to result in a 
narrowing of the gap between lagging devolved regions such as Wales and North 
East England and more prosperous non-devolved regions in the South and 
Midlands of England. This lack of an ‘economic dividend’ is consistent with the 
international evidence uncovered by Rodriguez-Pose and Gill (2004) who argue, 
on the basis of a six-county study, that devolution actually tends to encourage 
increased regional inequality by eroding the central redistributive mechanisms that 
mediate the impact of the spatial economic forces promoting regional divergence. 
                                                 
5  By contrast, devolution was about the constitutional rights of a historic nation in Scotland, and it emerged 
out of the ‘peace process’ between the unionist and republican communities in Northern Ireland. 
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Similarly, in their review of Spanish devolution, Giordano and Roller (2004) observe 
that the wealthier regions have benefited most from devolution, widening and 
complicating the pattern of territorial inequality. Over the longer-term then, 
devolution and the new model of regional policy seem likely to exacerbate the 
existing pattern of regional inequalities in the UK, reinforcing the North-South 
divide.   
 
DEVOLUTION AND ROUTE DEVELOPMENT FUNDS 
 
One interesting measure for promoting regional economic development 
which has been adopted by the devolved administrations in Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland is air Route Development Funds (RDFs). Aviation is perhaps an 
unlikely candidate for new initiatives from the devolved administrations because it 
remains a reserved power. In practice, however, Westminster’s control over 
aviation is somewhat mediated by the devolution of planning powers – the Scottish 
Executive can over-rule UK ministers’ desire to build a second runway at 
Edinburgh, for example, by refusing to grant planning permission. Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland have also elected to use their economic development 
function to establish Route Development Funds (RDFs) to provide financial support 
for new air services. These Funds, which began in Scotland in 2002 and have 
subsequently been adopted in Northern Ireland in 2003 and then Wales in 2005, 
are designed to promote economic development through increased inbound 
business travel, tourism and direct / indirect employment, as well as outbound 
business travel (Graham and Shaw, 2008). In this way, the RDFs illustrate well the 
type of conundrum faced by the devolved nations as they seek to work within the 
overall rubric of a sustainable – or integrated – transport policy: encouraging more 
air travel is hardly environmentally beneficial, but the accessibility benefits it brings 
are seen to justify subsidising the airlines (Friends of the Earth Scotland et al., 
2006; Scottish Enterprise, 2004).  
Subsidising airlines to encourage them to fly into regional or peripheral 
airports was an established practice in the European Union (EU) before the 
introduction of RDFs in the UK. In a number of cases, this had involved regional 
governments or publicly owned airports transferring money and / or benefits to 
privately owned airlines on account of the perceived accessibility benefits to the 
destination region. A daily Boeing 737-800 service equates to around 70,000 seats 
per year each way, for example, and such numbers are viewed as significant in 
terms of promoting regional economic development, not least tourism, by regional 
institutions. The Irish-based budget carrier, Ryanair, often derided for offering 
routes from ‘nowhere to nowhere’, is perhaps best known in Europe for being 
adept at negotiating advantageous deals. For example, Ryanair’s deal at Charleroi 
in Belgium was found to cover landing charges, promotion, route incentives, 
training and ground handing and lasted for 15 years (Graham and Shaw, 2008). 
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Such generous deals were also in evidence in the UK. Since 1999, Derry City 
Council had been paying Ryanair a guaranteed £250,000 per year plus free 
landing, parking and navigation facilities to operate a Londonderry-London 
Stansted service. In return, the airline paid £100 for each landing and take-off. This 
deal was suspended in 2005 under new EU guidelines after having cost local 
ratepayers some £300,000, with the remainder of the subsidy coming from tourism 
agencies and Donegal County Council (BBC, 2006). As this suspension indicates, 
court cases in relation to Ryanair’s agreements with airports around Strasbourg, 
Brussels (Charleroi) and Hamburg (Lübeck) have led to new EU regulations which 
stipulate strict conditions regarding the nature of support which can now be 
provided to airlines. The main criteria are that funding must be on a one-off basis 
and available to all carriers wishing to enter a market. As such, regional agencies’ 
efforts to subsidise airlines for regional development purposes are restricted by the 
system of multi-level governance in which they operate.  
The devolved administrations’ involvement with RDFs seems to have begun 
during the consultation phase for the UK Government White Paper The Future of 
Air Transport (Department for Transport, 2003). Aviation’s status as a reserved 
power means that, planning and economic development powers excepted, the 
influence of the new governments over air transport matters was potentially limited 
in the absence of innovative policy developments. One suggestion had been the 
protection of slots for services into London Heathrow, but this was not a favoured 
option at Westminster because of the implications for the operation of Heathrow 
as the UK’s premier international ‘gateway’ (Department for Transport, 2007). In 
response, the UK government actually supported the devolved nations’ schemes at 
the European level because they are viewed as preferable to the protection of slots 
at Heathrow and they absolve officials from having to setting up complex 
alternatives: 
I mean these [RDFs] have to be compliant with DfT rules, but they also 
have to be compliant with the European Commission rules… But DfT 
has put in a very strongly worded submission to the European 
Commission… about the importance of route development, and it’s 
also bringing out guidelines as to how they should be administered and 
assessed.  So the DfT actually supports us partly because I think it gets 
them off the hook of having public service obligation routes between 
London and regional airports which are very difficult to negotiate 
(Transport advisor, Northern Ireland). 
 
For instance, A National Protocol for UK Route Development Funds was 
adopted by Westminster to which the various RDFs in each of the constituent parts 
of the UK adhere (European Commission, 2006). As the same source commented 
on the introduction of RDFS, “it’s not really a question of devolution per se, it’s a 
question of slightly ad hoc arrangements, be it with the blessing of the DfT from 
London”. These cooperative inter-governmental relations highlight what might be 
termed the ‘conditional flexibility’ of the devolution settlement, to adapt the 
terminology of Trench (2007), allowing the devolved administrations to intervene 
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in an ostensibly reserved matter with the agreement of Westminster by creatively 
harnessing the overlap between different powers.  
The first RDFs were introduced in Scotland from November 2002 and 
worked by providing financial support at specified rates per passenger on new 
routes for a period of up to 3 years. This support was paid in addition to any 
‘normal’ incentives provided by airports to attract new traffic. The principal drivers 
for the RDFs’ establishment reflected the economic development rationale 
underpinning the already-existing deals elsewhere in the UK and Europe. Tavish 
Scott, Scottish Transport Minister from 2005-2007, noted that the RDF “channels 
its support to routes which deliver a net economic benefit for Scotland. These will 
be to routes which are likely to enhance business connectivity or which have the 
potential to bring appreciable numbers of inbound tourists to Scotland” (Scottish 
Parliament, 2005, unpaginated). He went on to note that the level of investment in 
new routes is determined by economic appraisals taking into account the following 
criteria: 
• The proposed route must be a new route; 
• The route must deliver a net economic benefit to the Scottish 
economy based on its projected carryings of inbound and outbound business 
passengers and inbound leisure passengers; 
• An international route serving Aberdeen or Dundee airports must be 
operated year-round, at an average frequency (over two consecutive scheduling 
seasons) of at least three round trip services per week. Key UK domestic air services 
can also be supported;  
• An international route serving Edinburgh and Glasgow Airports must 
be operated year-round, at an average frequency (over two consecutive scheduling 
seasons) of at least five round trip services per week, and 
• The level of frequency for new air services in the Highlands and 
Islands is flexibly applied and the fund can be used to support intra-Scotland, intra-
UK and seasonal services. This reflects the ability of the different areas to sustain air 
services in the long-term and the Executive’s aim that the fund should be inclusive 
and embrace all of Scotland’s diverse communities (Scottish Parliament, 2005, 
unpaginated). 
By 2005 RDFs had also been set up – apparently after having been adopted 
more or less unchanged from the Scottish scheme – in Northern Ireland, Wales 
and, supported by the RDA, the North West of England (Northwest Regional 
Development Agency, 2004). The Scottish RDF has supported more than 50 routes 
and the Northern Irish equivalent 9 (Table 2). In addition to the predicted 
economic benefits, there is also an important political dimension to RDFs which 
allow the devolved administrations to reduce their dependence on London and 
Heathrow airport in particular. They also offer a tangible ‘devolution dividend’ for 
the populations of the devolved territories by the establishment of new air routes 
which enhance accessibility and individual mobility, demonstrating that devolution 
can result in improved services and the provision of new economic opportunities.  
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The RDFs have had varying degrees of success. In Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland politicians and business groups were keen to play up the 
importance of the schemes with regard to regional economic development. For a 
relatively modest investment of around £7m in the Scottish RDF by 2004, for 
example, Scottish Enterprise, which administers the scheme on behalf of the 
Scottish Executive, estimated that £300 million of economic benefits over 10 years 
would result and 700 tourism related jobs would be created (Scottish Enterprise, 
2004). According to the Chairman of the company set up to manage the Northern 
Ireland RDF, the £3.8 million investment has “served its purpose, and has 
contributed greatly to the successful development of a broad spectrum of air routes 
in and out of Northern Ireland” (Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment 
(DETI), 2006, unpaginated). Friends of the Earth (2006) point out, however, that 
encouraging the growth of the aviation market is environmentally unsound, 
although others would argue that the RDFs can serve a useful purpose by 
promoting accessibility for economic growth rather than ‘mindless mobility’ 
(Graham, 2003). In response, Friends of the Earth contend that the net economic 
impact of aviation to the Scottish economy is actually a cost of around £1.4 billion 
in 2004 because more people fly out of the country and spend more money abroad 
than vice versa. Although their analysis is rather crude, it nevertheless highlights 
the possibility for the RDF to promote exactly the reverse of that which was 
intended as a confidential paper circulated within the Scottish Executive in 2007 
claims. In reality, it seems that RDFs simply extend existing patterns of international 
air travel from the UK which involve more outward than inward visits (Graham and 
Shaw, 2008), highlighting a contradiction between the micro-benefits for individual 
residents through increased mobility and the negative macro-consequences of net 
economic outflows for the regional economy, implying that the potential economic 
benefits were exaggerated. As a result of these development and changes in EU 
state aid regulations which mean that from 1 June 2007 support for ‘aeronautical 
charges’ – i.e. landing fees – will not be permitted, the RDFs are to be abandoned 
in all three jurisdictions with all support set to cease as current commitments 
expire.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Devolution represents a response of the central state to conflicting 
regionalist pressures from ‘below’ and transnational pressures from ‘above’, shaped 
by regional discourses of identity, improved governance and economic 
competitiveness (Rodriguez-Pose and Sandall, 2008). The establishment of 
devolved regional governments has been a widespread phenomenon over the past 
twenty five years, prompting Rodriguez-Pose and Gill (2004) to describe it as a 
global trend. As I have stressed, one of the defining features of UK devolution is its 
asymmetrical nature with different territories gaining different powers. The 
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complex, uneven form that devolution has taken in the UK reflects the legacy of a 
unique political geography, defined by the centralisation of power in London and 
the existence of territorial administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. 
It has reinforced a complex pattern of multi-level governance defined by the 
interactions between four distinct institutions levels: local authorities, the devolved 
administrations, the UK government and the EU. In some respects, Spain provides a 
comparable international example in terms of its system of asymmetrical devolution 
and the changing balance of functions between centre and regions (Giordano and 
Roller, 2004), although Spanish devolution was introduced in a very different 
political context of the transition to democracy in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
and the dynamic of regional catch-up seems to be largely absent from the UK 
where the most identifiable English region, the North East, voted overwhelmingly 
against the establishment of a regional assembly in 2004 (Sandford and 
Hetherington, 2005).  
One of the main arguments advanced by proponents of devolution is that it 
will enhance regional economic performance by allowing regions to adapt to a 
turbulent economic environment, enabling them to fulfil their economic potential 
(Rodriguez-Pose and Sandall, 2008). In the UK context, this argument has been 
particularly influential in Wales and the English regions (Hudson, 2005; Morgan, 
2006). In practice, however, although the devolved institutions remain relatively 
immature and it is always difficult to identify a discrete devolution ‘effect’, the 
anticipated ‘economic dividend’ of devolution is not apparent. Although the 
devolved administrations have launched a number of economic strategies and 
initiatives, this has not been translated into improved economic performance 
compared to non-devolved regions (Morgan, 2006). At the same time, the ‘new’ 
regional policy adopted in the UK since 1997 has defined regional under-
development in terms of deficiencies in productivity within regions, highlighting the 
need for RDAs to foster innovation and competiveness (HM Treasury, 2001). In 
contrast to the old’ regional policy of the 1960s and 1970s which targeted support 
on lagging regions, this approach treats ‘unequal regions equally’, requiring all 
regions to adopt a competitiveness-based approach (Morgan, 2006). Since they do 
not target resources on the poorest performing regions, devolution and the ‘new’ 
regional policy cannot be expected to reduce regional disparities in the UK, and the 
period since 1997 has seen a widening of the entrenched North-South divide 
(Cambridge Econometrics, 2007). Since 2007, what might be termed the extended 
‘honeymoon’ period of devolution, buttressed by common Labour control at 
devolved and Westminster levels and large rises in public expenditure, has come to 
an end, with nationalist parties entering into government in Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland. This ‘new territorial politics of devolution’ is likely to test the UK’s 
system of asymmetrical devolution to the full, something that will have far-
reaching implications for the territorial integrity of the UK.   
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Table1. Total identifiable expenditure on services in England and the devolved 
countries (£m), 2001/02 to 2006/07. Source: HM Treasury, 2007. 
 
Year England Scotland Wales Northern Ireland 
2001/02 255,696 31,770 17,460 11,831 
2002/03 272,815 33,500 19,015 12,603 
2003/04 301,702 36,817 20,514 13,386 
2004/05 324,285 38,486 21,751 14,172 
2005/06 344,682 41,671 23,028 15,024 
2006/07 361,119 44,050 24,233 16,263 
% increase 2001/02 to 2006/07 41.2 38.6 38.8 37.5 
 
Table 2. Route Development Fund supported flights from Scotland, 2007. Source: 
Scottish Executive, 2007. 
 
Airport Current destinations 
Aberdeen Bristol, Brussels, Copenhagen, Kristiansand, Liverpool, Oslo, Southampton 
Dundee Belfast City, Birmingham 
Edinburgh Atlanta, Barcelona, Dortmund, Gdansk, Geneva, Madrid, Milan, Munich, 
Warsaw, Zurich 
Glasgow Barcelona, Berlin, Boston, Toronto (Hamilton) 
Inverness Bristol, Dublin, Leeds-Bradford, Liverpool, Nottingham-East Midlands 
Prestwick Gdansk, Niederrhein (Düsseldorf), Pisa, Riga, Warsaw, Wroclaw 
Sumburgh London (Stansted) (seasonal) 
 
